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Abstract
The reality of the early 21st century is that the world is 
in the grip of the transformation of the power structure. 
China has risen into global reckoning; Russia began to 
rise from its inertia; North Korea has evolved to a global 
threat. All have begun to lay claims to a greater role in 
the international political system. The unipolarism of the 
post-Soviet era seems to be dissolving before our eyes. 
These emerging trends raise questions as to; what sort 
of multipolarism are we talking about? How will the 
coming multipolar order operate? Will great power be 
able to work together to uphold order? Will they descend 
into self centred and destabilizing military and economic 
competitions? Can the world support multiple world 
orders, co-existent yet separate? There are no iron-clad 
answers to these questions. However, current geopolitics 
does, perhaps, allow for a glimpse into the future. 
This article aims to contribute to that discourse by 
making three claims. First, there is a dramatic increase in 
the number of global actors. Second, the diversity among 
actors has created opportunities for the emergence of 
new systems and new partnerships and for old ones to be 
strengthened and transformed. Lastly, the future multi-
polar world will be potentially more unstable than all the 
other multi-polar periods history has experienced: for the 
first time in history, the world could become both multi-
polar and nuclear.
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INTRODUCTION
Two phenomenal events, more than any other, shaped our 
world in the last century. The first is the denotation of 
the first two weapons of mass destruction on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, both in Japan in 1945. The second was the 
pulling down of the Berlin wall in 1989. 
The use of the atomic bomb in the theatre of war, 
after several years of secret research and development, 
announced the arrival of the United States of America as 
the most powerful nation in the world, Before then, the 
United States was just one of the major powers, although 
one whose entry and contributions to the second world 
war, helped to save the world from Hitler’s philosophy of 
superiority of the Aryan Race and his dream of imposing 
a 1000-year Reich on the world, as well as from Japan’s 
aggressive imperial adventure in South-East Asia.
The atomic bomb also ensured that the Soviet 
Union did not convert its massive military advantage 
characterized by a huge military manpower and the largest 
assembly of tanks in any post war era. The Soviet Union 
had Western Europe by the jugular and was within its 
operational capability to occupy the rest of Europe but 
the reality of atomic bombs in the arsenal of the United 
S was always a sobering strategic reality. The communist 
romance of turning the world into one giant proletariat 
universe was moderated by the harsh prospects of nuclear 
annihilation.
For the first four years of the post second world war 
era, the world was in turmoil arising from the tensions 
over the management of the spoil of the war-Germany. 
Several times during that period, the prospects of war 
between the erstwhile allies against Germany loomed 
large, the most obvious being the Berlin blockade of 1949 
which was broken by heroic air drops of foods and drugs 
by the Wester powers. Fortunately, there was no war, 
instead, the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb 
in 1949 and by so doing, ended the monopoly which the 
United States had enjoyed for four years.
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The Soviet atomic bomb ushered in the era of the Cold 
War, characterized by a vicious nuclear arms race, fierce 
ideological confrontation, proxy wars and sponsorship 
of instability and regime change around the world. 
The Cold War lasted till the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, a momentous event which saw the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the restructuring of the world 
from bipolarism to unipolarism. Francis Fukuyama 
optimistically described it as the “End of History”, that is 
the end of the war inducing dialectics of power.  What we 
are witnessing he wrote at the time, 
is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular 
period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that 
is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government. (Fukuyama, 1989, p.2)
The Cold War came to an end in 1991 and the United 
States emerged as the only super power while western 
liberal democracy was on the march. That had however 
begun to change. China rose like a phoenix into global 
reckoning; Russia began to rise from its slumber; North 
Korea has evolved to a global threat. All have begun to 
lay claims to a greater role in the international political 
system. The unipolarism of the post-Soviet era seems to 
be dissolving before our eyes. 
The reality in this early 21st century is that the world 
once again is in the grip of the transformation of the 
power structure. But this does not tell the full story. What 
sort of multipolarism are we talking about? How will the 
coming multipolar order operate? Will great powers be 
able to work together to uphold order? Will they descend 
into self centred and destabilizing military and economic 
competitions? Can the world support multiple world 
orders, co-existent yet separate? There are no iron-clad 
answers to these questions. However, current geopolitics 
does, perhaps, allow for a glimpse into the future.
This article aims to contribute to that discourse by 
making three claims. First, there is a dramatic increase in 
the number of global actors. Second, the diversity among 
actors has created opportunities for the emergence of 
new systems and new partnerships and for old ones to be 
strengthened and transformed. Lastly, the future multi-
polar world will be potentially more unstable than all the 
other multi-polar periods history has experienced: for the 
first time in history, the world could become both multi-
polar and nuclear.
The article will be presented in four sections. In the 
first, we establish an understanding of multipolarism 
within the larger conceptualization of polarity and 
polarization. The second section will provide a historical 
overview of multipolarity. The third will focus on today’s 
world, arguing that a decline of United State’s unipolarity 
and the rise of other powers are creating the conditions 
for a multi-polar world. The final section argues that an 
emerging multi-polar world will be completely different 
from the multi-polar periods witnessed in history so far. 
The presence and availability of nuclear weapons will 
indeed allow even middle and small powers and non-state 
actors to seriously threaten and undermine global security 
and peace. 
1. UNDERSTANDING POLARITY 
In international relations, polarity is important in the 
understanding of global governance and in dealing with 
global issues in the current globalised world. Polarity 
describes the degree to which the global system revolves 
around one or more powerful states or “poles”—the 
distribution of power in the global system- the number of 
independent power centers, or poles, in the world (Kaarbo 
& James, 2011; Hughes, 2000). Polarity first distinguishes 
between great powers and lesser powers. Great powers 
have system wide interests and sufficient powers to purse 
them (Craig & George, 1983). Second, polarity identifies 
the number and relative size of great powers. Historically, 
great powers have constituted a limited subset of total 
states, seldom more than five or six (Sytoll, 1989). Third, 
polarity sometimes specifies relationships between great 
and lesser powers. Polarity defines the character of the 
international system at a particular period of time. The 
distribution of power capabilities in the international 
system determines the number of the great powers and, 
consequently, the polarity of the international system. 
If the great powers are more than two, the system will 
be multi-polar; if they are two, it will be bipolar, while 
systems with only one great power are considered 
unipolar, or hegemonic (Mearsheimer, 2001). Basically, 
polarities offer a powerful way of grasping the structure 
of power in historic and contemporary systems. 
Unipolarity: When a single entity dominates the 
system, it is unipolar. The unipolar system contains 
a single great power, meaning that only one state has 
most of the economic, military and cultural influence. 
Jervis (2009) argues that there are three main features of 
unipolar system: unipolarity being an interstate system 
rather than an empire. “Unipolarity implies the existence 
of many juridically equal non-states, something that an 
empire denies. In empires, inter-societal divide-and-rule 
practices replace interstate balance-of-power dynamic” 
(Jervis, 2009, p.190); unipolarity is anarchical. Waltz 
(1964) argues that “a great power cannot exert a positive 
control everywhere in the world” (Waltz, 1964, p.887). 
This kind of system has been characterized by the lack 
of competition among great powers and thus absence of 
war. According to Samuel Huntington, a unipolar system 
would have one superpower, no significant major powers, 
and many minor powers (Huntington, 1999). An example 
of a unipolar system according to Monteiro (2011), is the 
post-Cold War international system when the defence 
budget for the United States was “close to half of global 
military expenditures; a …Navy superior to all others 
combined; a chance at a splendid nuclear first strike…; 
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a defense research and development budget that is 80% 
of the total defense expenditures of its most obvious 
future competitor, China; and unmatched global power-
projection capabilities” (Monteiro, 2011, p.190). 
Bipolarity: As the name suggests, the bipolar system 
consists of two great powers. This means that there 
are only two spheres of influence. It is the distribution 
of power in which only two players have most of the 
military, economic and cultural influence regionally, 
or globally. Over and over again, spheres of influence 
develop. For instance, during the Cold War, most of the 
western democracies would fall under the influence of 
the United States. On the other hand, the communists 
nations would be under the influence of the Soviet 
Union. Following this, the great powers would often be 
scramble for the support of those remaining areas that 
are unclaimed (Toma & Gorman, 1991). The bipolar 
system is considered to be more stable compared to the 
other two types of system. This is due to the fact that it is 
less vulnerable to systemic change and great power war. 
In such a system, there is only the possibility of internal 
balancing because of the lack of other powers with which 
to create alliances (Lane & Maeland, 2008). In the bipolar 
system of the Cold War, each of the blocs the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), linking the United 
States to the defence of Western Europe and the Warsaw 
Pact, “military capabilities became concentrated in the 
hands of two competitive “superpowers” whose capacities 
to massively destroy anyone made comparisons with the 
other great powers meaningless” (Kegley, 2005). Alliances 
tend to be long term, based on relatively permanent, not 
shifting, interests. In a tight bipolar system, international 
organizations either do not develop or are ineffective. In 
a looser system, international organizations may develop 
primarily to mediate between the two blocs.
Multipolarity: Multipolarity refers to an international 
system in which there are three or more power centres. 
However, this may encompass arrangements ranging 
from tripolar systems (the USA, Japan and the EU in 
the latter decades of the twentieth century) to effectively 
nonpolar systems (Haass, 2008), in which power is so 
diffuse that no actor can any longer be portrayed as a 
“pole”. If there are a number of influential actors in the 
international system, a balance-of-power or multipolar 
system is formed. In a balance-of-power system, the 
essential norms of the system are clear to each of the 
state actors. In classical balance of power, the actors 
are exclusively states and there should be at least five 
of them. If an actor does not follow these norms, the 
balance-of-power system may become unstable. When 
alliances are formed, they are formed for a specific 
purpose, have a short duration, and shift according to 
advantage rather than ideology (Christensen & Snyder, 
1990). The multipolar system refers to a system with 
more than two great powers; a system of distribution 
of power in which the great powers have almost equal 
levels of cultural, military and economic influence 
(Kupchan, 1998). 
There are different opinions as far as the stability of 
this kind of system is concerned. For example, Classical 
realists like Morgenthau (1967) and Carr (1964), suggest 
that compared to bipolar system, this system is more 
stable. This is because in unipolar systems, great powers 
can have more influence through coming together in 
alliances but this is not possible with the other kinds 
of systems. On the other hand, the issues of security of 
states emerge as a limitation of the unipolar system. In 
the anarchic system, the states seek survival and self-
interest through balancing of power. This is the result of 
the need to survive. Looking from the perspective that 
the international systems are anarchic and are founded on 
self-help, the strongest units create the scene for the others 
and also for themselves. These are the major powers in 
the system (Waltz, 2000). Nevertheless, because of the 
intricacy of mutually guaranteed destruction situations, 
with weapons of mass destruction, multipolar systems 
may tend to be more stable compared to the other systems 
even in the analysis of neorealists. Neorealists argue 
that multipolarity creates a bias in favour of fluidity and 
uncertainty, which can lead only to instability and an 
increased likelihood of war (“anarchical” multipolarity). 
Liberals nevertheless argue that multipolar systems are 
characterized by a tendency towards multilateralism, 
as a more even division of global power promotes 
peace, cooperation and integration (“interdependent” 
multipolarity) (Heywood, 2011).
 Although the United States seems to dominate the 
international system, the world today is a multipolar 
system as there are many great powers. In this kind of 
system, there are regular shifts of alliances. Various 
alliances have been formed in various situations such as 
during the United States war on terrorism where other 
western democracies joined in the cause. The alliance 
keep on changing until one of these two things occur. 
Either there is striking of a balance of power or there is no 
side that is willing to attack the other, or there is an attack 
by one side on the other due either to fear of possibility 
of a new alliance, or there is a possibility that it can 
overcome the other side. In this kind of system also, the 
global decisions are normally made for strategic purposes 
to uphold a balance of power instead of historical or 
ideological purposes.
A system of multipolarity increases rivalry in world 
politics, the reason being that many states of similar 
strength compete for power and influence. These states 
are often uncertain of other states’ intentions, which 
increase the probability of military action. Also, the power 
balance in this type of system is constantly changing, as a 
result of changing alliances. The classical understanding 
of multipolarity is inseparably linked with the idea of the 
need for a balance of power (Kaarbo & James, 2011). 
The revival of this concept in the mid-1990s was the 
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reaction of the rest of the world, especially major powers, 
to Washington’s attempts to consolidate American 
hegemony. Today, this understanding is changing as 
the international environment itself has changed. The 
balance of power is a very complex phenomenon, since 
the definition of power has become less fixed. Power 
may be hard, soft, or economic, and states have it in 
different proportions. While lacking in one form of power, 
a state may possess other types of power. As a result, the 
balance of power becomes complex and nonlinear—if it 
is achievable at all. In addition, the globalizing economy 
dictates the ever-increasing interdependence of countries, 
which further distort the principles of a possible balance 
of power.
Multipolarity denotes the fundamental power structure 
in an international system dominated by several large 
powers, and is characterized by antagonism between 
these. Multipolarity may now be understood as a way 
of structuring the global international system where the 
basic constituent parts are no longer individual states but 
instead conglomerations of economic interests, united 
around the most powerful centers of attraction and 
economic growth. 
2. POLARITY IN HISTORY 
As William Shakespeare wrote: “All the world’s a stage.” 
And the world stage has many players upon it engaged in 
the great game of international politics. One of the oldest 
and universally acknowledged actors on the modern 
world stage is the state. While states are still the dominant 
actors on the world stage, they are by no means the only 
ones. Other groups of important players are the Inter 
Governmental Organizations, or IGOs, Nongovernmental 
organizations, also called NGOs and other transnational 
actors. States and other non state actors engage with 
one another in the international system. All states are 
considered to be sovereign, and some states are more 
powerful than others. 
International relations has existed as long as states 
themselves. But the modern international system under 
which we live today is only a few centuries old.  In 
1648, the Peace of Westphalia established the modern 
international system (Schroeder, 1994; Hughes, 2000). 
At the beginning of the 17th century, the multi-polar 
European order was swept away by the Thirty Years War, 
a conflict that lasted from 1618 to 1648 and was triggered 
by religious, territorial and dynastic disputes over internal 
politics and balance of power. The Peace of Westphalia, 
which introduced the concept of state sovereignty and 
gave rise to the modern international system of states. 
Subsequently, “at least until World War II, the European 
state system politically and militarily remained a generally 
multipolar one” (Hughes, 2000, p.66).
For any understanding of the developments of world 
history in the past century, one needs to know about the 
First World War, because it engendered a system shift 
from a Euro-centric World, Empires, Kings and Emperors 
and was the one event which shaped virtually everything 
that came after it. The political disruption surrounding 
World War I contributed to the fall of four venerable 
imperial dynasties—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia 
and Turkey. The failure of balancing mechanisms to 
prevent World War I gave rise to “a surge of globalist 
idealism and search for international cooperation in 
the period following it” (Hughes, 2000, p.66). The first 
global political institution, the League of Nations was 
established. The main purpose of the League of Nations 
was to assist in the management of a multipolar balance 
of power. The League of Nations existed between 1920 
and 1946 to promote world peace ultimately was unable 
to avert conflicts which would ultimately change human 
history and prevent the even deadlier World War II (Fisher, 
1938).
The state of war between Germany and the Allied 
Powers (mainly United States, British Empire, France, 
Italy, Japan, and other Allied Powers) ended with the 
Treaty of Versailles (one of the peace treaties at the end 
of World War I) of 28 June 1919. The Treaty of Versailles 
however, did not bring peace to Europe but helped the 
rise of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany (Hitler, 2009), 
and many historians believe that it was one of the crucial 
causes of World War II (Breuer, 1999). 
World War II served as a watershed between the multi-
polar world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and the bipolar world of the Cold War. It ended the 
military dominance of European powers, but also ushered 
in an era in which Europe, heavily aided in its recovery 
by the United States so as to avoid another European war, 
became a major economic power. The war transformed 
the United States from an isolationist giant, with little 
interest in affairs outside the Western Hemisphere, to a 
modern superpower (White, 1999). World War II was the 
catalyst of fundamental changes in the structure of the 
international political system. Following the surrender of 
Nazi Germany in May 1945 near the close of World War 
II, the uneasy wartime alliance between the United States 
and Great Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union 
on the other began to unravel. The victorious allies (joined 
by China) moved cooperatively to set up a multipolar base 
for the post-war international order. The United Nations 
was established. Each of them would sit in the Security 
Council and had veto power. Despite the wartime alliance 
with the Soviet Union, and the creation of the United 
Nations to settle international differences peacefully, the 
ensuing Cold War was a conceivable result of the war, 
which left two superpowers in its wake. The Soviet and 
American armies occupied Europe. The collapse of the 
European imperial system, the emergence of new states 
and a struggle between the Soviets and Americans for 
domination and influence defined the post-World War II 
confrontation. There were other features and phases of the 
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confrontation, but in the end, the Cold War was a struggle 
built on Europe’s decline (Friedman, 2013).
By the end of  World War II ,  the mult i-polar 
international system characterized by the pursuit of the 
balance of power among great powers, in a way that 
none of them was strong enough to predominate over 
others, transformed in bipolarity. The bipolar world was 
dominated by two opposite great powers with strong 
economic, military, and cultural influence on their 
allies. This nearly equal amount of distribution of power 
between the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) created an international 
system with no peripheries and with two different spheres 
of influence which resulted in stability for more than 40 
years and assured peace between the two great powers 
and limited wars in the rest of the world. The world was 
divided between the United States and its allies which 
would include its two wartime enemies, West Germany 
and Japan and the Soviet Union and its affiliates which 
include East Germany and Eastern Europe; Communist 
China from 1949 to the Sino-Soviet rift of the late 
1950s; and a number of states in the gradually emerging 
developing world of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 
By 1948 the Soviets  had insta l led lef t -wing 
governments in the countries of Eastern Europe that had 
been liberated by the Red Army. The Americans and the 
British feared the permanent Soviet domination of Eastern 
Europe and the threat of Soviet-influenced communist 
parties coming to power in the democracies of Western 
Europe. The Cold War had solidified by 1947-48, when 
U.S. aid provided under the Marshall Plan to Western 
Europe brought those countries under American influence 
and the Soviets had installed openly communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe.
 At first, the United States was the only superpower but 
that exclusive position did not last beyond 1949 when the 
Soviet Union tested its own atomic bomb thus unleashing 
a nuclear arms race and forcing the world into a bipolar 
power structure for the next forty years (1949-89). By 
1953, both sides had developed hydrogen bombs, which 
are much more destructive than atomic bombs. Both sides 
engaged in a race to match each other’s new weapons. 
Nuclear capability of the two superpowers assured their 
superior positions. The result was a “balance of terror.” 
Mutually Assured Destruction in which each side knew 
that the other side would itself be destroyed if it launched 
its weapons discouraged nuclear war. Still, the world’s 
people lived in constant fear of nuclear cataclysm.
The world was locked in a dangerous cold war 
between the communist East and the capitalist  West, 
which, occasionally, threatened the existence of the World, 
as in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), a confrontation that 
brought the two superpowers to the brink of war before an 
agreement was reached to withdraw the missiles. The two 
superpowers signed the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, 
which banned aboveground nuclear weapons testing. But 
the crisis also hardened the Soviets’ determination to be 
attained military inferiority, and they began a build up 
of both conventional and strategic forces that the United 
States was forced to match.
In the course of the 1960s and ‘70s, the bipolar 
struggle between the Soviet and American blocs gave 
way to a more-complicated pattern of international 
relationships in which the world was no longer split into 
two clearly opposed blocs. A major split had occurred 
between the Soviet Union and China in 1960 and widened 
over the years, shattering the unity of the communist bloc. 
In the meantime, Western Europe and Japan achieved 
dynamic economic growth in the 1950s and ‘60s, 
reducing their relative inferiority to the United States. 
Less-powerful countries had more room to assert their 
independence and often showed themselves resistant to 
superpower intimidation or persuasion. The 1970s saw an 
easing of Cold War tensions as evinced in the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that led to the SALT I and 
II agreements of 1972 and 1979, respectively, in which the 
two superpowers set limits on their antiballistic missiles 
and on their strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons (Heywood, 2011). That was followed by a period 
of renewed Cold War tensions in the early 1980s as the 
two superpowers continued their massive arms build up 
and competed for influence in the Third World. 
The Cold War began to break down in the late 1980s 
during the administration of Soviet leader Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev. President Gorbachev tried introducing 
Perestroika (Restructuring) and Glasnost (Freedom) to 
promote democracy and personal dignity. However, the 
Soviets were not prepared for this massive change and by 
early 1990s, the Union split into twelve Commonwealth 
of Independent States. The Russian economy, the 
major country that inherited the legacy, collapsed and 
lost international strategic power and standing. When 
communist regimes in the Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern 
Europe collapsed in 1989-90, Gorbachev acquiesced in 
their fall. The rise to power of democratic governments 
in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 
was quickly followed by the unification of West and 
East Germany under NATO auspices. Political reforms 
in the Soviet Union led to the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
and the reunification of Germany. The end of Cold War 
rivalry, and the emergence of the USA as the world’s sole 
superpower, created circumstances in which it was much 
easier to build consensus amongst major powers favouring 
intervention. In particular, neither Russia, then suffering 
from the political and economic turmoil of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, nor China, in the early phase of its 
economic emergence, was strongly minded to block or 
challenge the USA, the major driving force behind most 
interventions.
An era ended when the Soviet Union collapsed 
on December 31, 1991. After its implosion, and the 
collapse of the bipolar order, American domination of the 
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international system appeared to be complete. Francis 
Fukyama predicted it was the end of history, capitalism 
and liberal institutions had prevailed. A competing 
ideology no longer hindered a new world order under 
US dominance. “Democratic regimes flourished, the 
world economy was booming and most important, the 
US dominated in all spheres” (Confino, 2017). The 
US emerged as the only great power of a new unipolar 
international system (Kapstein, & Mastanduno, 1999). 
The well-defined hierarchy of power of the unipolar world 
allowed the US to remain largely unchallenged for many 
years and resulted in a relatively peaceful and stable world 
order (Mastanduno, 1997). This current stability, together 
with the precedent bipolar balance of power assured by 
the Mutual Assured Destruction, has been described as 
“the longest period without war among any of the major 
powers” (Ikenberry, 2002, p.150). 
The Soviet Union had broken down, her military 
was ill-equipped, the economy was in shambles and 
the political system was just unfolding and unstable. 
The United States established itself as a super power. 
America’s economic dynamism enabled it to become 
pivotal in both regional and world politics (Brzezinski, 
1997).  The path was forged through continuous 
application of US’s growing power; hard and soft 
alike. America shaped its regional milieu to best serve 
security and material ends. During this period the US 
flexed its muscles in Europe (The Bosnia/ Serb war) the 
Middle East, the liberation Kuwait, the invasion of Iraq 
over Weapons of Mass Destruction and the invasion of 
Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade 
centre and the Pentagon. There was hardly a word from 
any other power. 
Whilst many shifts in the international system 
accompanied the end of the Cold War and defined the 
post-Cold War world (Checkel, 1997), the post-Cold War 
world had two phases. The first lasted from December 31, 
1991to September 11, 2001. The second lasted from 9/11 
until now. The initial phase of the post-Cold War world 
was built on the assumption was that the United States 
was the dominant political and military power but that 
such power was less significant than before. The second 
phase still revolved around the three Great Powers—the 
United States, China and Europe—but involved a major 
shift in the worldview of the United States, which then 
assumed that pre-eminence included the power to reshape 
the Islamic world through military action while China and 
Europe focused on economic matters. (Friedman, 2013). 
There was the re-emergence of Europe as a massive, 
integrated economic power. The Maastricht Treaty was 
formulated, creating the structure of the subsequent 
European Union. Virtually unnoticed, China emerged 
from its cocoon, embraced capitalism and began to 
stretch its economic potentials to the rest of the World- 
dominating trade even in the developed countries and 
laying the foundation of an empire in Africa. Arguably, 
China became the largest economy in the World with the 
largest military force. China, among others, began to grow 
at unprecedented speed until, of course, China became the 
largest economy in the world (measured by Purchasing 
Power Parity) and the second largest (in nominal terms) 
(Held, 2017). Russia, also lifted by oil wealth and a 
more stable political system, began to reassert itself as a 
world centre of power. Globally, Russia’s nuclear arsenal 
matches that of the US and she has increasingly asserted 
her claim to super power status—first with the seizure of 
Crimea, and the blatant, intervention in the War in Syria. 
Indeed, Russia, intervention in Syria (2015) marked the 
end of two decades of America Global suzerainty.
The world quickly moved from the unipolarity of 
that period to a new structure in which power is less 
defined, in consequence of which, the world has become 
more dangerous. Regional power struggles replaced the 
old East-West conflict as seen in the Persian Gulf War. 
This review of the modern state system, emphasizing the 
evolution of parity, illustrates the utility of describing the 
world in such terms. 
3. EMERGING POWER CENTERS 
World order, in the modern period, is being shaped by 
a number of multipolar trends. The most significant of 
these is the rise of emerging power centers. These are the 
new, or the would-be, great powers of the twenty-first 
century. Some states already have a significant measure 
of regional influence—Brazil and, possibly, Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America; South 
Africa and Nigeria in Africa; Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran in the Middle East; and South Korea, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Australia in Asia and Oceania. However, a 
range of other powers have acquired, or are acquiring, 
wider, and possibly global, significance. These include, 
most obviously, China, Russia and India, but also Japan 
and the European Union. “Between them, and together 
with the USA, these powers account for over half the 
world’s population, about 75% of global GDP and around 
80 per cent of global defense spending” (Heywood, 2011, 
p.229).
Over the past two decades, the international order 
has undergone a qualitative change with a new discourse 
that emphasizes a rapidly changing global environment 
characterized by an ever-growing confluence of world- 
scale challenges gaining prominence. The challenges that 
range from Arab transitions, Asia rebalance, extremist 
movements, increasing terrorists and insurgents networks, 
rising political movements, transnational threats, irregular 
wars, and emerging centers of power are linked in 
inextricable ways and have far reaching implications 
on global politics (Beeson & Bisley, 2010). While 
anticipating the evolution of these challenges—propelled 
by various political, economic, legal, demographic, 
environmental, and technological factors—is a complex 
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task at best, it is clear that their individual and combined 
impacts are already shaping, and will continue to shape 
international relations.
3.1 Global Power Shift-Russia and China
It has become increasingly obvious that powers such 
as Russia and China are entering the world stage again. 
Russia won a war with Georgia in 2008, driving Georgian 
forces away from the separatist region of South Ossetia. 
The Kremlin asserted that it was protecting the interests 
of ethnic Russians in those areas. Since the coming to 
power of President Putin, the re-emergence of Russia 
as a global superpower has become a major political 
task for the Russian leadership (Macfarlane, 2006; Lo, 
2015; Kanet, 2007). Russia’s re-emergence as a great 
power has been evident in two major respects. First, 
since the sharp economic decline witnessed in the 1990s, 
associated with the “shock therapy” transition to a market 
economy, a notable revival has taken place. This has 
largely been driven by the substantial expansion of oil 
and gas production, itself made possible by the fact that, 
at 7 million square kilometers, the Russian land mass is 
significantly greater than any other country and is still 
largely unexplored, and by steadily rising commodity 
prices. Although its economy is in need of diversification 
and remains heavily dependent on world commodity 
markets, Russia has emerged as an energy superpower. 
This allows it, for instance, to exert influence over the 
states of Eastern Europe and beyond by controlling the 
flow and price of oil and gas resources. Second, fueled 
by growing economic confidence and strengthened 
nationalism, Russia has demonstrated a renewed appetite 
for military assertiveness, especially in relation to the so-
called “near abroad”. This was particularly demonstrated 
by the 2008 war with Georgia (Heywood, 2011).
From the Russian point of view, the new international 
order should be based on multipolarity, not unilateral 
U.S. domination, and with Russia as a leading center of 
global international relations (Więcławski, 2008). By his 
third term starting 2012, Putin began restoring Russia’s 
strategic position. Russia has reinforced its military and 
asserted itself on the world stage with a forcefulness 
not seen since the Cold War, heightening tensions with 
the West (Legvold, 2016). Russia is reinvesting in its 
bases in the Arctic by building new ones, expanding old 
ones and deploying personnel to operate them. Russia 
has repeatedly entered or skirted the airspace of other 
countries, including the United States (Einhorn, Fairfield, 
& Wallace, 2015). The Crimean peninsula in the Black 
Sea had traditionally housed the Russian Black Sea naval 
fleet. Though part of Ukraine, the understanding was that 
Russia will have full access to the port of Sevastopol. But 
since 1994, Ukraine had been partnering with NATO and 
was inclined towards the European Union. Russia found 
this strategically untenable. Seeing the West committed 
heavily in Iraq and Syria, and using the pretext of pro-
Russian agitation in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Putin 
decided to annex the strategically located Crimea. This 
was the first major foreign policy success of the now 
outward-looking Putin. Since it annexed Crimea in 
March 2014, the incidents have grown in number and 
seriousness. In several regions, Russia has exerted its 
military authority and sown instability to preserve its 
influence.
Russia’s role in the Syrian war escalated in September 
2015 when it started airstrikes to support the Syrian 
government of President Bashar al-Assad (Trenin, 2016). 
Taking the world by surprise, Putin moved Russian 
fighters, surveillance aircrafts and helicopters in support 
of Assad in Syria, to take on Islamic State. Syria and Iraq 
were traditional friends and recipients of Russian arms. 
Russia had a diminished role in Middle East since the 
Soviet collapse. But Putin finally sensed an opportunity in 
the complex regional dynamics of the war against Islamic 
State. Most of Russia’s airstrikes have been in rebel-held 
territory, rather than areas controlled by the Islamic State. 
Amnesty International has accused Russia of using cluster 
munitions and unguided bombs that it says have killed 
hundreds of Syrian civilians.
Russia gives preferential terms for natural gas 
imports to some countries, buying metallurgical facilities 
in Hungary and Poland, and buying rail terminals in 
Slovakia. Whereas, Russia has always been economically 
dysfunctional, she plays a significant role in the 
economies of former satellite states. The deals they make 
are not in their economic interests, but they increase 
Moscow’s political influence substantially.
With the focus shifting to the Asia-Pacific region, 
Russia began warming up to China and relations were 
sealed through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Russia built a trans-Siberian oil pipeline for markets in 
China, Japan and Korea. President Putin is also a valued 
friend of India, and the original architect of the India-
Russia strategic partnership. Putin’s Russia maintains 
positive relations with all BRIC countries. Russia 
successfully hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics and 
Paralympics and will also host the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its domination in 
Syria challenged Pax Americana. Not only did Putin get 
away with threatening Ukraine, a vital EU partner, he 
also seized an opportunity to fill the superpower vacuum, 
which the US left in the Middle East. While Putin’s 
actions in Russia’s own neighborhood, his annexing part 
of Georgia, his seizure of Crimea, his invasion of Ukraine, 
and his saber-rattling against the Baltics, were alarming, 
Russia’s military success in Syria is staggering: Just a 
quarter of a century after the Soviet Union was rebuffed 
from the Middle East, Putin’s sphere of influence stretches 
from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Putin 
assessed that Obama would not use military power to stop 
the Russian adventure in Ukraine. Ukraine was simply 
not threatening US national interests to an extent that 
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Obama would engage in a deadly war with Russia. At the 
same time, Putin knew that supporting Assad would mean 
gaining a vital foothold in the Middle East, and possibly 
cause a tremendous amount of immigrants flooding 
into Europe (Confino., 2017). Also, the US eroded its 
relationship with Egypt and opened the door for Russia 
to exert more influence there. Not surprising, the Kremlin 
was quick to jump at the opportunity to strengthen its ties 
with Egypt.
3.2 China
China is undoubtedly significant. Indeed, many predict 
that the twenty-first century will become the “Chinese 
century”, just as the twentieth century had supposedly 
been the “American century”. The basis for China’s great 
power status is its rapid economic progress since the 
introduction of market reforms in the mid-1970s under 
Deng Xiaoping (1904-97), the most dramatic phase of 
which began only in the 1990s (Hutton, 2007) . Annual 
growth rates of between 8% and 10% for almost thirty 
years (about twice the levels achieved by the USA and 
other western states) have meant that China became the 
world’s largest exporter in 2009, and in 2010 it overtook 
Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. 
By 2010, the Chinese economy was 90 times larger than 
it had been in 1978. With the world’s largest population 
(1.3 billion in 2007), China has a seemingly inexhaustible 
supply of cheap labour, making it, increasingly, the 
manufacturing heart of the global economy (Halper, 
2010). The resilience of the Chinese economic model was 
further demonstrated by the ease with which it weathered 
the 2007-09 global financial crises. China also has a 
growing military capacity, being second only to the USA 
in terms of arms expenditure. China’s emerging global 
role is evident in the influence it now exerts within the 
WTO and G-20 and over issues such as climate change, 
as well as in its many strengthened resource links with 
Africa, Australia and parts of the Middle East and Latin 
America. An often neglected aspect of China’s growing 
influence is the extraordinary rise of its ‘soft’ power. 
This reflects both the significance of Confucianism in 
providing a cultural basis for cooperation in Asia, and 
the attraction of its anti-imperialist heritage in Africa and 
across much of the developing South (Heywood, 2011).
China’s policy has been to maximize trade and 
economic links while adopting a moderate, low-key 
approach in discussing human rights (Frolic, 1997) 
China’s economic growth might have normalized in the 
past few of years, but it is still catching up with the US 
with an alarming speed (Dellios, 2004-2005; Frolic, 
1997) . Technologically, China has also proven to be a 
formidable adversary to the US. The US has accused 
China of hacking into US companies, and stealing vital 
information about technology and military inventions. 
Lastly, tensions in the South China Sea haven’t been 
solved (Confino., 2017). Even with the collapse of the 
Cold War structure, and the clear military and economic 
superiority that rests with the remaining superpower, the 
United States still supports the prevailing state system 
and is sensitive to balance-of-power as well as concerting 
behaviour. Thus China may continue to exercise its role of 
superpower critic as the need arises. China is not alone in 
its balancing efforts, as the failure of the US to gain UN 
support for its war on Iraq in 2003 demonstrated. In this 
sense, the European Union (EU) and its member states, 
Russia and others act as both a concerting and balancing 
force. China, too, acted in concert with the US in its 
campaign against state-defying terrorism (Dellios, 2004-
2005). 
China provides an alternative to the US modernization 
model based on liberal democracy by having incorporated 
capitalism into a socialist polity. It has still to present 
an acceptable human rights face to the world (Ibid.). 
Currently, because of its sheer size and the dispatch with 
which it has moved from the Third World Economy to 
industrial powerhouse, China’s arrival as a power is 
considered inevitable (Jacques, 2012).
Clearly, China’s economic and military transformation 
challenges the balance of power that has existed in the 
region since World War II. China has demonstrated 
hegemonic intentions and that it has the clout to press 
its prerogatives in more local disputes with its Asian 
neighbours  through its territorial claims in the South 
China Sea and in its actions against Taiwan. China is 
forging commercial relationships with African and Middle 
Eastern countries that can provide it natural resources. 
A more aggressive and expansionist policy may occur as 
China faces more pressure to provide food and resources 
for one quarter of the world’s population (Friedberg, 
2011). If the current transformation continues, China will 
have, in the future, the economic and military might to 
threaten both the countries in the region and the West. The 
closer ties with Russia have already resulted in a strategic 
relationship that is designed to counter the influence of the 
US. How long this relationship will be is unknown. With 
its ongoing effort to develop a high technology economic 
system, China has set the foundation that will likely 
ensure that it is much stronger than the former Soviet 
Union and perhaps even more powerful than the United 
State.
3.3 North Korea
The international community is accustomed to eruptions 
of hostility from North Korea, but in recent times, the 
crisis has reached a level rarely seen since the end of the 
Korean War, in 1953. The crisis has been hastened by 
fundamental changes in the leadership on both sides. In 
the six years since Kim Jong-un assumed power, at the age 
of twenty-seven, he has tested eighty-four missiles—more 
than doubles the number that his father and grandfather 
tested. Just before Donald Trump took office, in January, 
2017, he expressed a willingness to wage a “preventive” 
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war in North Korea, a prospect that previous Presidents 
dismissed because it would risk an enormous loss of 
life (The New Yorker, 2017). Trump is the fourth U.S. 
President to vow to put an end to North Korea’s nuclear 
program. Bill Clinton signed a deal in which North Korea 
agreed to freeze its nuclear development in exchange 
for oil and a civilian reactor, but neither side fulfilled 
its commitments. George W. Bush refused bilateral 
negotiations, then switched tactics and convened what 
are known as the Six-Party Talks. Obama first offered 
inducements, and later adopted a stonewalling policy 
called “strategic patience (Ibid.).
On July 4, 2017, North Korea passed a major threshold 
when it launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile 
powerful enough to reach the mainland United States. In 
response, on July 21st, authorities in Hawaii announced that 
they would revive a network of Cold War-era sirens, to alert 
the public in the event of a nuclear strike. Trump expressed 
hope to boost spending on missile defense by “many 
billions of dollars.” On September 3rd, after North Korea 
tested a nuclear weapon far larger than any it had revealed 
before (seven times the size of the bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki), the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
James Mattis, warned that a threat to America or its allies 
would trigger a “massive military response.” (Ibid.) 
On August 5th, as punishment for the missile test, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted some of the strongest 
sanctions against any country in decades, blocking the sale 
of coal, iron, and other commodities, which represent a 
third of North Korea’s exports. Despite the U.N. Security 
Council’s passage of the eighth round of sanctions against 
North Korea in eleven years, the North Korean nuclear 
program still went on. President Trump condemned North 
Korea’s claimed nuclear test in a series of tweets, calling 
Pyongyang’s words and actions “hostile and dangerous” 
and saying “talk of appeasement will not work.” Trump 
declared that “any more threats to the United States” will 
be met “with fire and fury like the world has never seen” 
whilst North Korea threatened to fire four missiles into 
the Pacific Ocean near the American territory of Guam, 
from which warplanes depart for flights over the Korean 
Peninsula. Trump in turn replied, in a tweet, that “military 
solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, 
should North Korea act unwisely.” (Ibid.) 
“North Korea has conducted a major Nuclear Test. 
Their words and actions continue to be very hostile 
and dangerous to the United States,” Trump tweeted, 
adding that Pyongyang “has become a great threat and 
embarrassment to China, which is trying to help but with 
little success.” President Trump further tweeted, “South 
Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of 
appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only 
understand one thing!” Summarily, the prospect of a 
nuclear confrontation between the United States and the 
most hermetic power on the globe had entered a realm of 
psychological calculation reminiscent of the Cold War era.
North Korea has evolved from being a regional 
menace to a global threat .North Korea’s claim that it had 
tested a hydrogen bomb represented a new dimension of 
threat. Tensions have risen on the Korean Peninsula after 
the test. Seoul launched a series of live drills in response 
and boosted the deployment of a controversial US-made 
missile defense system, THAAD. The North Korean threat 
is a global one now and it combines nuclear weapons 
and missiles. In the past people believed it was a regional 
one, which is no longer the case. North Korea is not at the 
nuclear weapon stage, but it has some nuclear weapons, 
nuclear explosive devices and missiles. 
Though Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program has 
captured more international attention, North Korea has 
also amassed a huge amount of artillery—some estimate 
as many as 8,000 artillery pieces—along the DMZ 
(Connelly, 2017). By 2020, experts believe that North 
Korea will have stockpiled enough nuclear material to 
build roughly 100 bombs. By 2020, these experts also 
believe that North Korea may have the capability to build 
and launch a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic 
missile that could reach the U.S. mainland ( Broad, 2016; 
Reif, 2017).
President Trump’s re-designation of North Korea as a 
state sponsor of terrorism along with Iran, Sudan and Syria 
may have dashed cautious hope in the region that talks and 
diplomacy would replace escalating tensions and bellicose 
threats. The move is to be followed by the highest level of 
sanctions. New sanctions are not likely to make any real 
difference on the already heavily penalized country. More 
likely, the designation will make diplomacy more difficult 
without increasing Washington’s leverage with North 
Korea probably taking the discrediting as another reason 
to stick to its hard-line policy of developing and testing 
nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Managing a nuclear North Korea will require stronger 
missile defenses in South Korea, Japan, Alaska, and 
Hawaii, and more investment in intelligence to track the 
locations of North Korea’s weapons, to insure a credible 
threat of destroying them. A nuclear-capable North Korea 
is a situation that is extremely dangerous. Because, at 
that point, any unexplained move that looks like it could 
involve preparations for a nuclear strike could precipitate 
an American preemptive response.
CONCLUSION: STATE OF THE WORLD
This article discussed the concept of multipolarity and the 
implications it has on the international system. It is evident 
that the global system is changing at a very high rate. 
More and new great powers are emerging in the global 
arena and challenging the existing players. The economic 
power and global wealth are shifting from the west to the 
east. This is evident when looking at developing nations 
such as China. This casts the world as a mutlipolar system 
where there no single nation that will have all the power 
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and influence in the global system. The inauguration of 
President Trump -an egomaniacal America President who 
thinks that nuclear bombs are weapons of domination of 
American prowess rather than destruction; a psychopathic 
“rocket man” in North Korea, who thinks that launching 
ballistic missiles is like playing video games; leading 
to greater instability and conflagration, and intractable 
terrorism constitute the current period (Held, 2017) and 
undermine the predictability of the bipolar/Cold War 
era as well as the stability of almost three decades of 
unipolarism which explains the behavior of the world. 
We are thus entering a new era. An era tending towards 
formlessness. 
There are several defining characteristics to this era 
we can identify. First, the United States is no longer 
the world’s dominant power in all dimensions. Second, 
Europe is returning to its customary condition of multiple 
competing nation-states. Third, Russia is re-emerging. 
As the European Peninsula fragments, Russia will do 
what she has always done: fish in muddy waters. China 
is managing its new economic realities. And fifth, a 
host of new countries and actors are emerging as global 
contenders (Friedman, 2013). Viewed from a ‘society of 
states’ perspective, that is, a system intent on preserving 
itself, contention is matched with concerting behaviour. 
Great powers, indeed global powers with unprecedented 
economic and security interdependence—must concert 
together as much as compete. The world no longer 
operates, if ever it did, as a zero-sum game. In this sense, 
China’s rise may be seen as an asset in world terms. 
Western dominance has come to a clear halt with 
the shortcomings and failures of dominant elements of 
western economic and security policy over the last three 
decades. The west can no longer rule through power or 
example alone. The trajectory of change is towards a 
multipolar world, where the west is no longer predominant 
(Held, 2017). Both China and Russia individually as well 
as in cooperation with other powers are beginning to 
challenge United State’s unilateralism. These are evident 
signs of the emergence of a multipolar world.
The fact that the 21st century ushered in a state of 
increased interdependence (despite increasing tendency 
towards cooperation to contain terrorism) did not negate 
the principle of competition as a key driving force in 
international affairs. As competition intensifies, the 
question of how international actors can ensure their 
own interests and overall stability while experiencing 
globalization becomes increasingly relevant. To this 
degree we no longer live in a world composed of clearly 
specified friends and well-defined enemies, but rather in 
one where partnership has become a necessity. Second, 
the current world order is changing once again. We are, 
in an emerging multipolar era—an era that is likely to 
be more unstable. Paradoxically, it is likely to be fairer, 
because the arrogance of one will be contained by the 
actions of other great powers. This has been demonstrated 
by the US becoming a supplicant at the altar of China 
in order to contain the threat posed by a nuclear-armed 
North Korea. Fortunately, nuclear conflagrations will 
remain largely impossible inspite of the bombast of 
Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, his “rocket man” friend 
in North Korea. The downside is that there might be 
an increase in non-nuclear conflicts around the world, 
anxieties over nuclear proliferation, more frequent tension 
between the United States and Russia on the one hand, 
and between the United States and China on the other. 
What these portend, is that in an emerging multipolar 
world, contestations among the great powers will be more 
frequent and the world would be more turbulent, if not 
more dangerous.
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